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Abstract
We revisit a classic question in international economics: how does a country￿ s pro-
ductivity growth a⁄ect worldwide real incomes through international trade? We ￿rst
identify the channels through which productivity shocks transmit in a model featuring
inter-industry trade as in Ricardo (1817), intra-industry trade as in Krugman (1980), and
￿rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003). We then estimate China￿ s productivity growth
at the industry level and use our model to quantify what would have happened to real
incomes throughout the world if nothing but China￿ s productivity had changed. We ￿nd
that average real income in the rest of the world increased by a cumulative 0.48% from
1992-2007 due to China￿ s productivity growth. This represents 2.2% of the total income
gains to the world.
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11 Introduction
In an economy closed to international trade, real income given factor inputs depends only on
total factor productivity (TFP). Holding factor inputs ￿xed, a 10 percent increase in TFP
simply results in a 10 percent increase in real income. In an economy open to international
trade, real income given factor inputs is instead also a⁄ected by the gains from trade. Holding
factor inputs ￿xed, a 10 percent increase in TFP then no longer necessarily leads to a 10
percent increase in real income since the TFP shock then also spills over to other countries
through changes in the gains from trade.
A classic literature including Hicks (1952), Johnson (1955), Bhagwati (1958), and Dorn-
busch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) analyzes such spillover e⁄ects in the context of simple
trade models in which the gains from trade derive solely from comparative advantage. The
central message of this work is that the international spillover e⁄ects of a country￿ s TFP
growth can be positive or negative. In particular, TFP growth tends to bene￿t the trad-
ing partner if it is biased towards the export-oriented industry as this improves the trading
partner￿ s terms-of-trade. In contrast, TFP growth tends to harm the trading partner if it
is biased towards the import-competing industry as this deteriorates the trading partner￿ s
terms-of-trade.
Despite the potential importance of such spillover e⁄ects, surprisingly little is known
about their empirical importance. Some ground is covered by Eaton and Kortum (2002) who
illustrate their seminal framework by quantifying the e⁄ects of hypothetical TFP shocks on
other countries.1 However, their analysis focuses on hypothetical TFP shocks only and is
also subject to two methodological limitations. In particular, their framework only allows
for aggregate TFP shocks and therefore cannot account for biased TFP shocks of the sort
emphasized by the classic literature. Also, their framework only features gains from compar-
ative advantage and therefore cannot capture potential spillover e⁄ects through changes in
1Fieler (forthcoming) provides a similar exercise in an Eaton and Kortum (2002) model with non-homothetic
preferences.
2the gains from increased variety or the gains from increased industry productivity that are
the focus of much of the ￿ new￿trade literature.
In this paper, we quantify the spillover e⁄ects of actual TFP shocks using a methodology
which does not su⁄er from these limitations. At the core of our analysis lies a multi-country
multi-industry general-equilibrium model of international trade featuring inter-industry trade
as in Ricardo (1817), intra-industry trade as in Krugman (1980), and ￿rm-heterogeneity as
in Melitz (2003). This model allows us to account for biased TFP shocks as well as spillover
e⁄ects through changes in the ￿ new￿gains from trade.
Our application focuses on the TFP growth associated with China￿ s emergence as a global
manufacturing powerhouse during the past two decades. Speci￿cally, we measure China￿ s
TFP growth at the 2-digit industry level for the years 1992 through 2007 from plant level
data, and use our model to quantify what would have happened to real incomes around the
world if nothing but China￿ s TFP had changed. We ￿nd that the TFP of the median Chinese
manufacturing industry grew at an average rate of 15% per year with a standard deviation of
3.6. Our estimates suggest that the cumulative spillover e⁄ect of China￿ s productivity growth
was a 0.48% increase in the average real income of the rest of the world. This implies that
2.2% of the cumulative worldwide gains from China￿ s productivity growth accrued to the rest
of the world.
In terms of the question we ask, our work is most closely related to the classic literature on
the spillover e⁄ects of productivity growth as well as Eaton and Kortum￿ s (2002) important
paper. Such spillover e⁄ects are also central to Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) who incorporate
an endogenous growth model into an Armington (1969) model of international trade. Since
growth is export-biased in such a model, higher growth leads to a deterioration of the terms-
of-trade which generates de facto diminishing returns to growth. In terms of the model we use,
our framework is a multi-industry extension of the Melitz (2003) model used by Arkolakis et al
(2008, 2010). Arkolakis et al (2008, 2010) demonstrate how changes in the gains from trade can
be measured from observed changes in openness. Here, we essentially predict counterfactual
3changes in openness from observed changes in China￿ s TFP. Notice that changes in China￿ s
TFP are but only one of the multiple forces that a⁄ect openness so that observed changes in
openness are not informative of the spillover e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework,
identi￿es the channels through which productivity shocks a⁄ect welfare, and demonstrates
how we quantify the global welfare e⁄ects of productivity growth. Section 3 shows how we
estimate China￿ s productivity growth, describes the data, and reports the empirical results.
In the interest of brevity, derivations are omitted in the main text. A detailed technical
appendix is available upon request.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Setup
There are N countries indexed by i or j and S industries indexed by s. Consumers have access
to a continuum of di⁄erentiated varieties. Preferences over these varieties are summarized by
















where xijs is the quantity of an industry s variety from country i consumed in country j,
Mijs is the ￿ number￿of industry s varieties from country i available in country j, ￿s > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution between industry s varieties, and ￿js is the fraction of country
j income spent on industry s varieties.
Firms are technologically heterogeneous which is captured by the following production
process. Entrants into industry s of country i have to hire feis units of labor in country i
to draw their productivities ’ from a distribution Gis (’), where feis is a ￿xed cost of entry.
We assume that Gis (’) varies by country and industry giving rise to Ricardian comparative
4advantage. Entrants into industry s of country i wishing to sell to country j further need
to hire
xijs￿ijs
’ units of labor in country i and fijs units of labor in country j to deliver xijs
units of output to country j, where ￿ijs ￿ 1 is an ￿ iceberg￿trade barrier and fijs a ￿xed cost
of serving market j. Both the number of entrants into industry s of country i Meis and the



















the ideal price index of all industry s varieties, !j the wage rate, and Lj the number of con-
sumers or workers. Pro￿t maximization requires that ￿rms in industry s of country i whose
















￿s￿1 denotes the productivity cuto⁄ above which revenues are














where prob(’ > ’
￿
ijs) is the probability that an entrant into industry s of country i sells to
country j and E(￿ijsj’ > ’
￿
ijs) are the expected operating pro￿ts of an entrant into industry











where ￿i denotes the fraction of country i workers hired by country i entrants to cover their






expected number of workers required by entrants into industry s of country i to cover their
￿xed costs of entry as well as their variable costs of production. Finally, the industry price
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1
￿s￿1 is the productivity of the representative ￿rm
in industry s of country i selling to country j and Mijs = prob(’ > ’
￿
ijs)Meis. These in-







It is useful to assume that the productivity distribution is Pareto with shape parameter
￿s > ￿s￿1 and location parameter bis: Gis(’) = 1 ￿ (bis
’ )
￿s. The above equilibrium conditions
can then be simpli￿ed using the relationships prob(’ > ’
￿
ijs) = ( bis
’￿
ijs)















We use the equilibrium conditions implied by the Pareto distribution henceforth.
2.3 Transmission channels
We now examine the channels through which productivity shocks transmit. Productivity
growth in industry s of country i is captured by an increase in the productivity parameter bis
which shifts the entire distribution of possible productivity draws to the right. We restrict
attention to small productivity shocks for now.
Since welfare is given by real labor income, changes in welfare Vj induced by small changes
6in the productivity parameters bis can be expressed as
b Vj = b !j ￿
X
s
￿js b Pjs (7)
where a ￿ hat￿denotes a growth rate. Using equations (3) and (6), changes in the industry price














m Tmjs and Tijs denotes the total value of industry s trade from country i
to country j. Changes in the industry price indices Pjs are thus expenditure share weighted
averages of changes in average prices b e pijs = ￿b e ’ijs + b !i and elasticity of substitution adjusted
changes in available variety.
Using equation (8) and the de￿nitions of ’￿
ijs and e ’ijs, it can be shown that
P
i ￿ijsc Mijs =
0 and
P
i ￿ijsb e ’ijs =
P
i ￿ijsb bis+ 1
￿s
P












Ultimately, changes in bis a⁄ect Pjs either directly, or indirectly through changes in !i or
Meis. To understand the intuition underlying this result, it is useful to consider these direct
and indirect e⁄ects in turn.
Consider ￿rst an increase in one bis, say bvs, leaving all other bis as well as all !i and Meis
unchanged. This directly decreases Pjs by increasing e ’vjs, as ￿rms in country v get more
productive. This e⁄ect is captured by the ￿rst term in equation (9). In addition, the increase
in bvs also increases the proportion of country v￿ s entrants selling to country j and decreases
the proportion of all other countries￿entrants selling to country j. As a consequence, Mvjs
increases and e ’vjs decreases as the new exporters in country v are less productive that the
incumbent exporters. Similarly, Mijs decreases and e ’ijs increases as the former exporters in
7the other countries are less productive that the continuing exporters. The e⁄ect of the increase
in Mvjs on Pjs is exactly o⁄set by the e⁄ect of the decrease in the other Mijs. Similarly, the
e⁄ect of the decrease in e ’vjs on Pjs is exactly o⁄set by the increase in the other e ’ijs.
Consider now an increase in one !i, say !v, leaving all other !i as well as all bis and Meis
unchanged. This directly increases Pjs by making all industry s varieties from country v more
expensive in country j. This e⁄ect is captured by the second term in equation (9). Just as
above, all additional variety and productivity e⁄ects exactly cancel.
Consider ￿nally an increase in one Meis, say Mevs, leaving all other Meis as well as all
bis and !i unchanged. This directly decreases Pjs by increasing Mvjs. In addition, it also
decreases the proportion of all countries￿entrants selling to country j by increasing ’￿
ijs in
all countries. As a consequence, there is a reduction in all Mijs and an increase in all e ’ijs
as the former exporters in all countries are less productive than the continuing exporters.
On balance, Mvjs increases but all other Mijs decrease. These o⁄setting variety e⁄ects again
exactly cancel. What is di⁄erent now is that all e ’ijs increase so that there is no o⁄setting in
the productivity e⁄ects. These productivity e⁄ects are captured by the last term in equation
(9).
In summary, changes in variety induced either directly or indirectly by changes in bis have
no net e⁄ect on Pjs. Moreover, only changes in average productivity induced either directly
by changes in bis or indirectly by changes in Meis have a net e⁄ect on Pjs. These ￿ndings
are related to the recent results by Arkolakis et al (2008, 2010), Feenstra (2009), and Atkeson
and Burstein (2009) that changes in trade barriers often have similar aggregate e⁄ects in
models with and without ￿rm heterogeneity. They make us depart in critical ways from two
important literatures.
The ￿rst is the literature on the measurement of changes in the variety gains from trade
(e.g. Feenstra, 1994, Broda and Weinstein, 2008). In that literature, changes in the variety
gains from trade are typically computed from changes in the number of imported varieties only.
But consider the variety e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth. On the one hand, China￿ s
8productivity growth implies that more Chinese varieties become available to US consumers as
Chinese ￿rms become relatively more competitive. On the other hand, it means that fewer US
varieties remain available to US consumers as US ￿rms become relatively less competitive.
Our analysis suggests that these two e⁄ects are exactly o⁄setting so that changes in the
number of domestic varieties cannot be ignored.2
The second is the literature on the measurement of changes in the productivity gains
from trade (e.g. Pavcnik, 2002, Tre￿ er, 2004). In that literature, improvements in domestic
industry productivity are typically interpreted as increases in the productivity gains from
trade. But while China￿ s productivity growth forces the weakest US ￿rms to stop serving the
US market, it also allows some weaker Chinese ￿rms to start serving the US market. The ￿rst
e⁄ect increases the average productivity of ￿rms serving the US market but the latter e⁄ect
decreases the average productivity of ￿rms serving the US market and both have to be taken
into account when measuring changes in the productivity gains from trade.
Overall, equations (7) and (9) imply that changes in welfare induced by small changes in


















s ￿js￿ijsb bis captures the direct e⁄ect changes in bis have on prices in coun-




s ￿js￿ijs (b !j ￿ b !i)
captures the change in purchasing power induced by the general equilibrium adjustment in
relative wages so that we will refer to it as relative wage e⁄ect. In combination, the direct








d Meis captures the change in average productivity induced by the indirect
e⁄ect changes in bis have on entry and exit. Since entry in one industry of one country always
comes along with exit out of the same industry in another country we will refer to it as pro-
2While the exact o⁄setting is clearly the result of special functional form assumptions, it captures two basic
counteracting forces which also feature in more general models.
9duction relocation e⁄ect. We explore the determinants of the signs of these spillover e⁄ects in
the next section.
Internationally, the relative wage and production relocation e⁄ects have a zero sum char-
acter. This can be seen most clearly in the special case ￿s = ￿ and ￿s = ￿ for all s since
the worldwide average welfare e⁄ect is then completely independent of relative wage and
















b Vj is the GDP-weighted average of all countries￿welfare e⁄ects. This
implies that the worldwide average welfare e⁄ect is simply a sales-share weighted average of
the productivity growth rates in every sector and country.
2.4 Quanti￿cation
We now extend the above analysis by allowing for productivity shocks of any size and by
characterizing the general equilibrium adjustments in relative wages and entry. We do so by
adapting the method of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2006) to our framework.
Speci￿cally, using equations (3) and (6) as well as the de￿nitions of ’￿
ijs and e ’ijs, changes
in welfare induced by discrete changes in the productivity parameters bis can be written as










1 + b !j
1 + b !i
￿￿￿s ￿




where a ￿ hat￿denotes a growth rate just as before.3 This equation can be thought of as an
integral over equation (10). Notice that it also features direct price, indirect relative wage,
and indirect production relocation e⁄ects. However, they now a⁄ect welfare multiplicatively
since their impacts on trade shares are taken into account.
3In the previous section, we focused on small changes so that b x =
dx
x . Now we consider changes of any size
so that b x =
4x
x .
10Moreover, it can be demonstrated that the equilibrium conditions (2) - (5) require





































. If one wage is chosen as the numeraire,
this represent a system of N (S + 1)￿1 equations in N (S + 1)￿1 unknowns whose coe¢ cients
depend on ￿s, ￿s, and trade ￿ ows only. Given estimates of ￿s and ￿s and data on trade
￿ ows only, the full general equilibrium adjustment in relative wages and entry can therefore
be computed for any N and S. Conveniently, no information is required on the remaining
model parameters Li, feis, ￿ijs, and fijs. These general equilibrium adjustments can then be
substituted into equation (12) to compute the welfare e⁄ects of productivity shocks. Notice







To understand the nature of the general equilibrium adjustments as well as the determinants
of the signs of the spillover e⁄ects, we now turn to some illustrative examples. These examples
all focus on the special case of two countries (￿China￿and the ￿US￿ ) and two industries (1
and 2), and examine the e⁄ects of a 10% productivity improvement in industry 1 of China.
To illustrate the nature of the general equilibrium e⁄ects, it is su¢ cient to focus on a fully
symmetric example in which industry expenditure shares and import expenditure shares are
equal across countries and industries.5 Table 1 presents the general equilibrium adjustments
implied by equations (13) and (14) for a particular example of this sort. Notice that the
4Before taking the model to the data, we also introduce an exogenous trade surplus parameter along the
lines of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to deal with the aggregate trade imbalances observed empirically. We discuss
the resulting generalizations of equations (12) - (14) in the appendix.
5In terms of our formal notation, industry expenditure shares are given by ￿js and import expenditure
shares are given by
Tijs
!jLj .
11productivity growth in industry 1 of China leads to an increase in the relative wage of China
as well as entry into industry 1 of China, exit out of industry 1 of the US, exit out of industry
2 of China, and entry into industry 2 of the US. Intuitively, expected pro￿ts from entering into
industry 1 of China become positive and expected pro￿ts from entering into industry 1 of the
US become negative, as ￿rms from industry 1 of China become relatively more competitive.
As a consequence, there is entry into industry 1 of China bidding up wages in China so that
there is also exit out of industry 2 of China. Also, there is exit out of industry 1 of the US
depressing wages in the US so that there is also entry into industry 2 of the US. Both the
entry into industry 1 of China as well as the increase in wages in China reduce the expected
pro￿ts from entering into industry 1 of China back to zero. Similarly, both the exit out of
industry 1 of the US as well as the reduction in wages in the US increase the expected pro￿ts
from entering into industry 1 of the US back to zero. Moreover, the counteracting entry and
wage e⁄ects in industry 2 of both countries ensure that the expected pro￿ts from entering
into industry 2 remain zero.
To illustrate the determinants of the terms of trade e⁄ects (i.e. the combination of the
direct price and relative wage e⁄ects), it is necessary to allow for variations in the pattern of
inter-industry trade. We therefore maintain the assumption of identical industry expenditure
shares but allow for varying import expenditure shares. In particular, we contrast two cases.
In the ￿rst case, China is a net exporter in industry 1; and in the second case, China is a
net importer in industry 1. Table 2 presents a particular example of this sort. Column 1
shows the direct price e⁄ect on the US, column 2 the relative wage e⁄ect on the US, and
column 3 the production relocation e⁄ect on the US, all as de￿ned by equation (10). Column
4 then gives the net welfare e⁄ect on the US as implied by equation (12).6 The two rows cover
the two di⁄erent cases. Notice that the US gains from China￿ s productivity growth if it is
biased towards China￿ s export-oriented industry but loses from China￿ s productivity growth
if it is biased towards China￿ s import-oriented industry, just as in the classic analyses. This is
6The general equilibrium responses are again computed from equations (13) and (14). Since equation (10)
is a linear approximation to equation (12), the individual e⁄ects do not exactly add up to the overall e⁄ects.
12because the positive direct price e⁄ect on the US gets ￿ltered through a large industry import
share if it occurs in China￿ s export-oriented industry but through a small industry import
share if it occurs in China￿ s import-oriented industry while the negative relative wage e⁄ect
on the US always gets ￿ltered through the same overall import share since the wage growth
a⁄ects both industries at the same time.7
To illustrate the determinants of the production relocation e⁄ects, it is necessary to allow
for industries to be of di⁄erential importance in consumption. We therefore revert to the case
of identical import expenditure shares but allow for varying industry expenditure shares. In
particular, we contrast two cases. In the ￿rst case, industry 1 is more important in consump-
tion; in the second case, industry 2 is more important in consumption. Table 3 present a
particular example of this sort. Recall that the productivity growth in industry 1 of China
makes China gain entrants in industry 1 at the expense of the US, and makes the US gain
entrants in industry 2 at the expense of China. Notice that these production relocations harm
the US in the ￿rst case but bene￿t the US in the second case. Intuitively, the US always loses
from the production relocations in industry 1 since the decrease in average productivity due
to exit in the US outweighs the increase in average productivity due to entry in China, given
that we (realistically) assume US goods to account for a larger share of US expenditure. At
the same time, the US always gains from the production relocations in industry 2 since the
increase in average productivity due to entry in the US outweighs the decrease in average
productivity due to exit in China by the same token. The net e⁄ect depends on the industry
expenditure shares. The US gains if industry 2 is more important in consumption than in-
dustry 1, as in the second case, but loses if industry 2 is less important in consumption than
7One subtle di⁄erence to the classic analyses is that the US gains more from China￿ s productivity growth
if it is biased towards China￿ s export-oriented industry than it loses from China￿ s productivity growth if it
biased towards China￿ s import-oriented industry. Indeed, it is easy to verify that the US also gains if China￿ s
productivity growth is unbiased in the sense that there is no inter-industry trade. This di⁄erence is due to
the existence of Krugman (1980) type intra-industry trade. In a sense, productivity growth is always export-
biased in a Krugman model since each country always specializes in a unique set of varieties. Essentially, the
properties of a Krugman model at the industry-level are similar to the properties of a Ricardian model at the
country-level since both feature complete specialization.
13industry 1, as in the ￿rst case.8
In summary, we can therefore expect the global spillover e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity
growth to be positive if it is positively correlated to China￿ s comparative advantage and if it
is negatively correlated to industry importance as measure by industry expenditure shares.
Of course, the magnitudes of the spillover e⁄ects are also in￿ uenced by the overall importance
of international trade as well as third-party terms-of-trade and production relocation e⁄ects.
3 Empirical application
We now apply this framework to China, asking what would have happened to real incomes
around the world if nothing but China￿ s productivity had changed. We ￿rst use Chinese
plant level data to estimate productivity growth at the 2-digit industry level. We then use
the estimates of Chinese productivity growth along with data on world trade ￿ ows to measure
the e⁄ect of Chinese productivity growth on world real income.
3.1 Estimating b bis
We proceed in two steps to estimate productivity growth in China. We ￿rst estimate the
productivity growth rate of the representative establishment b e ’iis in each 2-digit Chinese in-
dustry. We use the fact that the price and revenue of the representative plant are given by
piis (e ’iis) = ￿s
￿s￿1
!i
e ’iis and riis (e ’iis) = ￿s￿s
￿s￿￿s+1!ifiis, respectively. Assuming that the ￿xed
costs of production fiis are unchanged, the growth rate of representative productivity can
thus be calculated from 1 + b e ’iis =
1+ \ riis(e ’iis)
1+ \ piis(e ’iis)
. The representative price is a quantity share
weighted average of prices in the domestic market charged by ￿rms in the industry, which we
can approximate by a standard industry price de￿ ator.9 In turn, the revenue of the repre-
8This production relocation e⁄ect is closely related to the e⁄ect identi￿ed by Venables (1987) in the context
of a Krugman (1980) model and by Demidova (2008) in the context of a Melitz (2003) model. A key di⁄erence
is that our model does not feature a freely traded numeraire good. As a consequence, entry into one industry
always comes at the expense of exit out of other industries in our setup.
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14sentative plant is even simpler as it is just an average of revenues of domestic sales.10 The
growth rate of representative productivity can thus be measured as 1+b e ’iis = 1+b riis
1+ b Dis
, where b riis
denotes the growth rate of average revenue and b Dis denotes the growth rate of the industry
price de￿ ator. Intuitively, we know that the growth rate of productivity is proportional to the
growth rate of factor prices minus the growth rate of average prices. In turn, since average
revenues from domestic sales are proportional to domestic factor prices, the growth rate of
productivity is simply given by the growth rate of average revenues minus the growth rate of
average prices.
We then estimate the shift in the productivity parameters b bis from our estimate of b e ’iis:












￿s e ’iis where ￿iis ￿ Tiis P
m Tims is
an inverse measure of trade openness. Assuming that c feis = b fiis, we can estimate b bis from
1+b bis =
￿
1 + b e ’iis
￿￿
1 + b ￿iis
￿ 1
￿s . Intuitively, we infer b bis from b e ’iis by adjusting for the e⁄ect
changes in openness have on representative productivity (the Melitz (2003) e⁄ect). In sum,
we compute b bis as
1 +b bis =
1 +b riis
1 + b Dis
￿
1 + b ￿iis
￿ 1
￿s (15)
where b riis is the growth rate of average revenue, b Dis is the growth rate of the industry price
de￿ ator, and b ￿iis is the growth rate of the inverse measure of openness.
3.2 Data and parametrization
To implement our methodology, we need industry-level data on external trade ￿ ows for all
countries, internal trade ￿ ows for all countries, domestic mean revenues for China, and price
de￿ ators for China.
To estimate Chinese productivity growth, we use the plant level data from the Chinese
Annual Survey of Industrial Production from 1992 through 2008.11 This data is a census
of all state-owned plants and non-state plants with more than 5 million Yuan (about $600
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11We de￿ne the productivity growth rate for 1992 as the productivity change between 1992 and 1993 et
cetera.
15thousand dollars) in revenues collected by China￿ s National Bureau of Statistics.12 The raw
data consists of slightly over 100 thousand plants in the beginning of the sample to over 300
thousand plants by 2008. The information from this data that we use are gross output and
exports at the plant level. With this data, we compute domestic sales for each plant as gross
output minus exports for each plant. We then compute mean revenues from domestic sales
for each 2-digit sector (22 sectors in total) for the years 1992 through 2008. Price de￿ ators at
the 2-digit level are obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook.
We use the United Nations trade data to estimate external bilateral trade from 1992
through 2007.13 We reclassify the industries in the trade data to 2-digit industries following
the classi￿cation used by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. As for internal trade
￿ ows, we directly measure this for China and the US as industry gross output minus industry
exports. We obtain the Chinese data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production and
the US from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (after reclassifying the four
digit U.S. industries to 2-digit Chinese industries). For the other countries, we do not have
detailed industry data so we have to resort to using aggregate data to back out the implied
internal trade ￿ ows. The procedure we use is as follows. We estimate aggregate consumption
in manufacturing as gross output in manufacturing minus total exports plus total imports.14
We then use the data on sectoral consumption shares in China and the US (for which we have
data) to ￿t a regression line of the sectoral consumption share on GDP/worker for China and
the US. We then use the coe¢ cient on GDP/worker from this regression to predict the share of
each sector in total consumption for the countries for which we do not have detailed industry
data. We then use this predicted share along with the estimate of aggregate consumption
to back out an estimate of sectoral expenditures in these countries. With the estimate of
sectoral expenditure, we estimate internal trade as sectoral consumption minus net exports
12See Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for additional details on this dataset.
13This data was generously made available to us by Robert Feenstra, Gordon Hanson, and John Romalis.
14We use data from the World Development Indicators for aggregate value-added in manufacturing. Follow-
ing Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2006), we assume that manufacturing value added is 31.2% of gross output.
16in the sector. We then aggregate the countries into 17 countries/regions.15
Finally, we assume that the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of productivity is
￿ = 5 for all sectors and the elasticity of substitution between the varieties in each sector is
￿ = 3 for all sectors.16
3.3 Results
Table 4 reports the share of manufacturing imports from all countries in domestic manufactur-
ing expenditure by country. Excluding China, this share has increased from 20.8% to 32.0%
over the sample period on average. Table 5 presents the share of manufacturing imports from
China in domestic manufacturing expenditure by country. Excluding China, this share has
increased from 0.5% to 3.8% over the sample period on average. While manufacturing im-
ports from China therefore only account for 2.4% of total manufacturing imports in 1992 on
average, they already account for 11.9% of total manufacturing imports in 2007 on average,
re￿ ecting the rising importance of China to the world economy.
To measure the welfare e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth, we estimate China￿ s annual
industry productivity growth rates b bis from 1992 through 2007.17 We take geometric averages
over all years to attenuate possible measurement error and assume that the productivity
growth rate in each year is simply the average growth rate from 1992 through 2007. Figure
1 plots the distribution of productivity growth rates across industries. Productivity growth
rates are typically large and also vary substantially across industries. The median productivity
growth rate is 15% and the interquartile range is (12%;17%). Figures 2 and 3 relate the
productivity growth rates to industry net exports and industry expenditure shares in China
for 1994 and 2005. Importantly, there is almost no correlation visible in either ￿gure which
15The countries/regions are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Africa, other Asia (including Australia), other Europe, and other Latin
America. We have no trade data for Russia until 1996 so that we focus on the remaining countries/regions in
earlier years.
16Eaton et al (2008) estimate ￿ = 4:87, which falls between related estimates in the literature.
17Recall that we de￿ne the productivity growth rate for 1992 as the productivity change between 1992 and
1993 et cetera.
17indicates that the predicted global spillover e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth will not be
large.
Using these estimated productivity growth rates and the trade data in each year, we
then predict the annual adjustments in wages b !i and the number of entrants d Meis in across
the world from 1992 through 2007 from equations (13) and (14).18 Since we assume that
productivity growth in each year is the average productivity growth rate from 1992 through
2007, the variation in these general equilibrium adjustments across years is due to changes in
the pattern of trade. Figure 4 plots the distribution of wage adjustments relative to China￿ s
wage across all countries for the years 1994 and 2005. Not surprisingly, wages of all the other
countries fall relative to China￿ s wage as a consequence of Chinese productivity growth. The
￿gure also indicates that the relative wage change becomes smaller and more dispersed over
time. Figure 5 plots entry in China against China￿ s productivity growth for the years 1994
and 2005. As can be seen, the model predicts entry into industries with higher productivity
growth rats and exit from industries with lower productivity growth rates.
Table 6 presents the predicted change in real income from Chinese productivity growth
from 1992 through 2007 calculated from equation (12). Table 6 gives the year by year es-
timates of the welfare e⁄ects on China and the world, as well as the cumulative change in
welfare over the entire time period (in the last row). The ￿rst column gives the e⁄ect of
Chinese productivity growth on Chinese welfare. Cumulatively, China experiences a more
than ninefold welfare increase over the sample period. The second column gives the e⁄ect of
Chinese productivity growth on world welfare, de￿ned as an output weighted average of wel-
fare growth of the countries/regions in our data (the term b V de￿ned above). Not surprisingly,
since the share of China in the world economy is rising over this period, the e⁄ect of Chinese
productivity growth on average world welfare growth increases from 0.61% in 1992 to 2.03%
in 2007. The third column presents the average welfare growth of the other countries in the
world (other than China). The average growth rate of welfare in the other countries also in-
18We actually use generalizations of equations (13) and (14) which allow for aggregate trade imbalances.
These equations are discussed in the appendix.
18creases over time, from 0.012% in 1992 to 0.053% by 2007. Cumulatively, the average welfare
in the rest of the world increases by around half a percentage point from 1992 through 2007.
The fourth column calculates the share of the welfare gains to the rest of the world divided
by the welfare gain to the world. Since China became more integrated with the rest of the
world over this time period, the share of the world welfare gains from Chinese productivity
growth that "accrued" to the rest of the world also rises, from 1.9% in the beginning of the
period to 2.6% by the end of the period.
Table 7 presents the cumulative welfare gain (from 1992 through 2007) from Chinese
productivity growth for individual countries/regions. Chinese productivity growth is "re-
sponsible" for a 0.33% improvement in U.S. welfare from 1992 through 2007. For the other
countries, the welfare improvement is generally large for countries in Asia (0.87% in Japan
and 1.42% for the other Asian countries) and small for the countries in Latin America (0.12%
for Argentina, 0.05% for Brazil, and essentially zero for the other Latin American countries).
The surprisingly exception to the pattern in Latin America is Mexico, where our estimates
suggest that Mexico￿ s welfare improved by 0.61% due to Chinese productivity growth. This is
surprisingly because of the widespread perception that Mexico "competes" in the same prod-
uct space as China so the e⁄ect of Chinese productivity growth would have lowered Mexico￿ s
terms-of-trade. For example, Hanson and Robertson (2010) use the results from a gravity
model of trade to estimate the e⁄ect of Chinese export growth on the demand for Mexico￿ s
products, and generally ￿nd that China￿ s productivity growth (as measured by its exports)
would lower the demand for Mexican exports by 2% to 4%. This e⁄ect may be present, but
what our estimates capture are three additional e⁄ects of Chinese productivity growth on
Mexican welfare. First, we capture the e⁄ect of Chinese productivity growth on prices of
Mexican imports from China. Second, our general equilibrium framework captures the equi-
librium response of relative wages in Mexico (relative to US) and the e⁄ect of the relative
wage change on the terms-of-trade. Third, we measure the e⁄ect of Chinese productivity
growth on the entry and exit of ￿rms in all the countries and industries in the world.
19We now turn to tables that decompose the net welfare change. As equation (12) shows,
the net welfare change is a nonlinear combination of the e⁄ect of Chinese productivity growth
on the terms-of-trade and the production reallocations. Because of the nonlinear nature
of these e⁄ects, there is no clean way to decompose the net welfare change into the e⁄ect
stemming from changes in the terms-of-trade and the entry and exit of ￿rms. However, when
the productivity change is small, the welfare change can be approximated as the sum of the
terms-of-trade e⁄ect and the production reallocation e⁄ect using equation (10). Although
this equation is not entirely correct for large changes in productivity, we use it to compute
the implied net welfare change given our estimates of the change in wages and entry and exit
of ￿rms along with data on the productivity growth in China and the trade shares. We then
calculate the implied share of the hypothetical welfare change due to the two e⁄ects (changes
in the terms-of-trade and production reallocation). Table 8 then presents the product of these
hypothetical shares and the actual welfare changes shown in Tables 6 and 7. Again, we remind
the reader that this decomposition is imperfect because it is only valid for small productivity
changes and the productivity growth we have witnessed in China averages 15% per year. With
that caveat ￿rmly in mind, the ￿rst column in Table 8 presents the % change in the welfare
(cumulative from 1992 to 2007) due to changes in the terms-of-trade. The second column
presents the estimated welfare change due to entry and exit of ￿rms for all the countries and
industries. As can be seen, both the terms-of-trade e⁄ect as well as the production relocation
e⁄ect can be signi￿cant.
Table 9 turns to a decomposition of the terms-of-trade e⁄ect into changes in the country￿ s
terms-of-trade relative to China and the terms-of-trade relative to the other countries of the
world. The ￿rst column presents the welfare change due to changes in the country￿ s terms-
of-trade relative to China. This is simply the sum of Chinese productivity growth in each
sector and the change in the country￿ s wage relative to China￿ s wage, summed up across all
sectors using China￿ s share in the country￿ s expenditure basket (equation (10)). The second
column presents the welfare change due to changes in the country￿ s terms-of-trade relative
20to the other countries in the world. This e⁄ect captures the e⁄ect of Chinese productivity
growth on wages of the other countries. As can be seen, both the bilateral as well as the
multilateral terms-of-trade e⁄ect can be signi￿cant.
4 Conclusion
How does a country￿ s productivity growth a⁄ect worldwide real incomes through international
trade? Given the economic rise of China, this classic question is of particular relevance today.
Can other countries reap some of the bene￿ts of China￿ s productivity growth?
In this paper, we revisited this classic question in the context of modern trade theory and
quanti￿ed the e⁄ect of China￿ s productivity growth on worldwide real incomes. We ￿rst iden-
ti￿ed the channels through which productivity growth externalities travel in a multi-country
multi-industry general-equilibrium model of international trade, featuring inter-industry trade
as in Ricardo (1817), intra-industry-trade as in Krugman (1980), and ￿rm heterogeneity as
in Melitz (2003). We then estimated China￿ s productivity growth at the industry level and
used our model to quantify what would have happened to real incomes throughout the world
if nothing but China￿ s productivity had changed. Our estimates suggest that the cumulative
spillover e⁄ect of China￿ s productivity growth was a 0.48% increase in the average real in-
come of the rest of the world. This implies that 2.2% of the cumulative worldwide gains from
China￿ s productivity growth accrued to the rest of the world.
Our analysis is very much a ￿rst pass at this question. To capture more of the complexities
of the world, it could be extended in a number of ways. For example, one could introduce
di⁄erences in factor endowments and factor intensities to also shed light on the e⁄ects of
China￿ s productivity growth on within-country inequality. Moreover, one could allow for non-
traded goods and intermediate goods to assess the magnitudes by which non-traded goods
dampen and intermediate goods magnify the spillover e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth.
Finally, one could depart from our assumption that the labor supply facing the manufacturing
sector is ￿xed. If labor supply increases in response to productivity growth, this is likely to
21generate additional terms-of-trade gains for the rest of the world by dampening the relative
increase in Chinese wages. At the same time, it is likely to imply additional production
relocation losses for the rest of the world by allowing China￿ s manufacturing sector as a whole
to expand at the expense of other countries. We leave these extensions for future work.
Our framework could also be applied to analyze the spillover e⁄ects of other shocks.
While we have focused on the worldwide e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth, it could also
be used to study the e⁄ects of the growth implosion in Sub-Saharan Africa or the productivity
slowdown of Western Europe and the US since the 1970s. As another example, it could be
applied to look at changes in trade policy. For example, Ossa (2011) uses it to analyze the
spillover e⁄ects of tari⁄ changes and their implications for multilateral trade negotiations.
225 Appendix
Introducing exogenous trade surplus parameters NXj into the budget constraints yields the
following generalizations of equations (12) - (14):
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adjustment terms which reduce to 1 if NXj = 0. NXj can be computed from observed




￿s￿s NXis. The factor
(￿s￿1)(￿s+1)
￿s￿s is necessary since the model also features endogenous aggregate net exports in
general due to the assumption that the ￿xed cost of exporting are paid in destination country
labor which generates international transfers of income.
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266 Tables
TABLE 1: Hypothetical E⁄ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on Relative Wages and Entry and Exit
b !CH ￿ b !US d MeCH;1 d MeCH;2 d MeUS;1 d MeUS;2
4.14% 21.48% -21.48% -22.41% 22.41%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in Chinese wage relative to US wage (column 1), Chinese number
of entrants in industry 1 and 2 (columns 2 and 3), and US number of entrants in industry 1 and 2 (columns
4 and 5) from 10% productivity growth in China in industry 1. Simulation assumes that nominal incomes
are the same in both countries, industry expenditure shares are 50% in both countries and industries, import
expenditure shares are 10% in both countries and industries, theta1=theta2=5, and sigma1=sigma2=3.
27TABLE 2: Hypothetical E⁄ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on US Welfare
Price Wage Relocation Total
NXCH;1 > 0 1.5% -0.82% -0.11% 0.83%
NXCH;1 < 0 0.5% -0.83% -0.01% -0.17%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in US real income due to the direct price e⁄ect (column 1), the
relative wage e⁄ect (column 2), and the production relocation e⁄ect (column 3) from 10% productivity growth
in China in industry 1 following equation (10). Column 4 calculates net welfare gain following equation (12).
Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are the same in both countries, industry expenditure shares are 50%
in both countries and industries, theta1=theta2=5, and sigma1=sigma2=3. In the ￿rst row, China is assumed
to have an import expenditure share of 5% in industry 1 and an import expenditure share of 15% in industry
2 with the US being the mirror image so that China is a net exporter in industry 1. In the second row, China
is assumed to have an import expenditure share of 15% in industry 1 and an import expenditure share of 5%
in industry 2 with the US being the mirror image so that China is a net importer in industry 1.
28TABLE 3: Hypothetical E⁄ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on US Welfare
Price Wage Relocation Total
￿1 > ￿2 0.5% -0.39% -0.29% 0.11%
￿1 < ￿2 0.5% -0.45% 0.29% 0.15%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in US real income due to the direct price e⁄ect (column 1), the
relative wage e⁄ect (column 2), and the production relocation e⁄ect (column 3) from 10% productivity growth
in China in industry 1 following equation (10). Column 4 calculates net welfare gain following equation (12).
Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are the same in both countries, import expenditure shares are 5%
in both countries and industries, theta1=theta1=5, and sigma1=sigma2=3. In the ￿rst row, industry 1 is
assumed to have an expenditure share of 60% in both countries. In the second row, industry 1 is assumed to
have an expenditure share of 40% in both countries.
29TABLE 4: Share of Imports in Domestic Expenditure
1992 2000 2007
China 16.0% 16.3% 19.9%
United States 13.5% 21.0% 25.2%
Argentina 6.4% 12.5% 16.8%
Brazil 4.7% 12.7% 9.6%
Canada 34.5% 46.1% 48.7%
France 28.8% 43.0% 49.9%
Germany 21.7% 33.8% 39.4%
India 10.3% 17.3% 21.3%
Italy 19.3% 30.7% 35.7%
Japan 4.8% 8.7% 12.2%
Mexico 22.0% 41.3% 36.2%
Russia n/a 11.3% 20.1%
United Kingdom 27.3% 39.6% 42.1%
Africa 36.9% 35.3% 51.3%
Other Asia 26.3% 28.8% 38.1%
Other Europe 33.0% 41.2% 41.1%
Other Latin America 23.0% 19.2% 23.9%
Notes: Entries are total manufacturing imports/domestic expenditures on manufacturing goods. We have no
trade data for Russia until 1996.
30TABLE 5: Share of Chinese Goods in Domestic Expenditure
1992 2000 2007
China 84.0% 83.7% 80.1%
United States 0.9% 2.0% 4.7%
Argentina 0.2% 0.6% 1.9%
Brazil 0.0% 0.4% 1.0%
Canada 0.8% 1.6% 4.3%
France 0.5% 1.4% 2.9%
Germany 0.6% 1.3% 3.2%
India 0.2% 1.1% 5.2%
Italy 0.3% 0.8% 2.5%
Japan 0.4% 1.6% 3.9%
Mexico 0.3% 0.7% 3.3%
Russia n/a 0.7% 2.6%
United Kingdom 0.7% 2.0% 3.6%
Africa 0.8% 2.0% 6.9%
Other Asia 1.5% 2.1% 8.3%
Other Europe 0.7% 1.6% 3.5%
Other Latin America 0.3% 1.0% 2.5%
Notes: Entries are manufacturing imports from China/domestic expenditures on manufacturing goods. We
have no trade data for Russia until 1996.
31TABLE 6: Welfare Gain from China￿ s Productivity Growth
China World Rest of World Share Rest of World
1992 14.0% 0.61% 0.012% 1.9%
1993 13.8% 0.67% 0.014% 2.1%
1994 13.9% 0.73% 0.016% 2.1%
1995 14.1% 0.89% 0.018% 2.1%
1996 14.3% 1.02% 0.018% 1.7%
1997 14.4% 1.13% 0.022% 2.0%
1998 14.7% 1.16% 0.023% 1.9%
1999 14.9% 1.20% 0.024% 2.0%
2000 14.8% 1.25% 0.028% 2.3%
2001 14.2% 1.49% 0.032% 2.1%
2002 14.2% 1.52% 0.041% 2.7%
2003 13.9% 1.53% 0.046% 3.0%
2004 15.8% 1.47% 0.042% 2.9%
2005 16.2% 1.70% 0.043% 2.6%
2006 16.9% 1.84% 0.050% 2.7%
2007 17.0% 2.03% 0.053% 2.6%
1992-2007 969.0% 22.45% 0.484% 2.2%
Notes: Entries are predicted welfare changes from productivity growth in China. World welfare gain is average
welfare gain in the world weighted by each country￿ s output share. Rest of World refers to countries other
than China. 1992-2007 welfare gain (last row) is cumulative welfare gain from 1992 to 2007.
















Other Latin America -0.04%
Notes: Entries are cumulative welfare gains from 1992 to 2007 from China￿ s productivity growth. We have no
trade data for Russia until 1996 so that Russia￿ s gain refers to the years 1996 to 2007 only.
33TABLE 8: Welfare Change Due to Terms-of-Trade and Production Relocation
Terms-of-Trade Relocation











United Kingdom 0.97% -0.74%
Africa 0.28% 0.03%
Other Asia 1.26% 0.16%
Other Europe 0.33% -0.11%
Other Latin America 0.78% -0.82%
Notes: Entries are cumulative welfare gains due to terms-of-trade changes and production relocations (entry
and exit of ￿rms). The covariance between the terms-of-trade e⁄ect and production reallocation e⁄ect is evenly
distributed between the two terms.
34TABLE 9: Welfare Change Due to Bilateral and Multilateral Terms-of-Trade
Terms-of-Trade Terms-of-Trade
vis-a-vis China vis-a-vis Rest of World











United Kingdom 0.72% 0.25%
Africa 0.45% -0.18%
Other Asia 0.73% 0.53%
Other Europe 0.42% -0.09%
Other Latin America 0.35% 0.43%
Notes: Entries are cumulative welfare gains due to terms-of-trade changes vis-a-vis China and terms-of-trade
changes vis-a-vis the Rest of the World. The covariance between the bilateral and multilateral terms-of-trade
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Figure 1: Distribution of Productivity Growth Across Manufacturing Industries in China
Notes: Each observation is the average productivity growth rate in a Chinese 2-digit manufacturing industry





































































Figure 2: Industry Productivity Growth and Industry Net Exports in China
Notes: Each dot in the ￿gure represents a Chinese 2-digit industry. The line is the non-parametric relationship



















































Figure 3: Industry Productivity Growth and Industry Expenditure Share in China
Notes: Each dot in the ￿gure represents a Chinese 2-digit industry. The line is the non-parametric relationship
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Figure 5: Industry Entry/Exit and Productivity Growth in China
40